Key Facts
- Dates
- 23–27 October 1917
- Front width
- 12.1 km (7.5 mi)
- French corps engaged
- XIV, XXI, and XI Corps (six divisions)
- Tanks attached
- 63 Schneider CA1 and Saint-Chamond
- German artillery disadvantage
- Outnumbered 3-to-1 by French guns
- German withdrawal
- Night of 1/2 November to north bank of Ailette
Strategic Narrative Overview
The French Sixth Army conducted a six-day preliminary bombardment—extended two days by bad weather—with artillery outnumbering German guns three-to-one. Zero hour was moved forward to 5:15 a.m. after a German intercept revealed enemy readiness. XIV, XXI, and XI Corps attacked on a 12.1 km front; 63 tanks were deployed but 27 bogged down in mud. The 38th Division took Fort de Malmaison, XXI Corps seized Allemant and Vaudesson, and rapid gains on 24–25 October prompted the French to bring up I Cavalry Corps in anticipation of a German collapse.
01 / The Origins
The Battle of La Malmaison was the concluding French offensive of 1917 on the Western Front, growing out of the disastrous Nivelle Offensive earlier that year. Following widespread mutinies in the French army, General Pétain sought a limited, carefully prepared attack to restore morale and secure a tactically valuable position on the Chemin des Dames ridge. The objective was the village and fort of La Malmaison, commanding access to the ridge above the Ailette valley.
03 / The Outcome
Facing untenable positions, the German 7th Army executed the Bunzelwitz Manoeuvre, withdrawing on the night of 1/2 November from the Chemin des Dames to the north bank of the Ailette. France secured full control of the ridge, achieving its limited objectives at relatively low cost. The success helped rehabilitate French army morale after the mutinies and effectively closed offensive operations on the French front for 1917.
Belligerents & Mobilization Analysis
Side A
1 belligerent
Side B
1 belligerent
Max von Boehn.
Kinetic Engagement Axis
Scroll horizontally to view full axis. Events plotted relatively.