Key Facts
- Date
- 16 February 1991
- Operation context
- Pre-Desert Storm ground offensive deception
- Primary deceived force
- Iraqi Republican Guard
- Intended effect
- Lure Iraqi reinforcements away from western flank
Strategic Narrative Overview
On 16 February 1991, Coalition forces conducted operations along the Wadi al-Batin designed to convince Iraqi commanders that the primary ground assault would advance up this corridor. Iraqi forces responded by reinforcing their positions facing the wadi, concentrating combat power on the eastern axis. This redeployment drew troops and resources away from the western flank, where U.S. VII Corps was secretly massing for the decisive armored envelopment of Iraqi forces.
01 / The Origins
During Operation Desert Storm in early 1991, Coalition planners sought to conceal the main axis of the ground offensive from Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait and southern Iraq. The Wadi al-Batin, a natural geographic corridor running into Kuwait, represented an obvious and expected invasion route. Coalition commanders decided to exploit this expectation by conducting a deliberate feint before the main ground campaign began on 24 February 1991.
03 / The Outcome
The deception succeeded in shaping Iraqi defensive dispositions before the ground war began. When VII Corps launched its main attack on 24 February 1991, it encountered a weakened western flank and achieved rapid penetration. The broader ground campaign concluded in approximately 100 hours with the liberation of Kuwait and a decisive Coalition victory, though the specific outcome of this feint engagement is not separately documented.
Belligerents & Mobilization Analysis
Side A
1 belligerent
Side B
1 belligerent
Kinetic Engagement Axis
Scroll horizontally to view full axis. Events plotted relatively.