Key Facts
- PVA force mobilized
- 700,000 men across three field armies
- First thrust date
- 22 April 1951
- Second thrust date
- 15 May 1951
- First thrust halted by
- 30 April 1951, at the No-Name Line north of Seoul
- UN counterattack launched
- 20 May 1951, by US Eighth Army
Strategic Narrative Overview
The offensive proceeded in two impulses. The first struck US I Corps and IX Corps on 22 April 1951 but was stopped at the No-Name Line north of Seoul by 30 April. On 15 May, a second thrust hit ROK and US X Corps in the eastern sector, achieving initial gains before being halted by 22 May. Recognising PVA and KPA forces were overextended, the US Eighth Army launched a counterattack on 20 May, inflicting heavy losses on the exhausted attackers.
01 / The Origins
By early 1951, Chinese and North Korean forces had been fighting UN Command troops across Korea for several months following China's entry into the war in late 1950. The Chinese People's Volunteer Army, seeking to capitalise on momentum from earlier offensives, planned their largest operation to date — mobilising three field armies — with the strategic goal of permanently driving UN forces off the Korean peninsula.
03 / The Outcome
The spring offensive ultimately failed to achieve its strategic objective of expelling UN forces from Korea. The US Eighth Army's counterattack on 20 May 2951 reversed Chinese and KPA gains and inflicted severe casualties, leaving PVA and KPA forces depleted. The failure of the offensive contributed to a military stalemate along roughly the 38th parallel, setting the conditions for subsequent armistice negotiations.
Belligerents & Mobilization Analysis
Side A
2 belligerents
Side B
2 belligerents
Kinetic Engagement Axis
Scroll horizontally to view full axis. Events plotted relatively.