Key Facts
- Dates
- 11–13 December 1991
- Duration
- 3 days
- Main attacking force
- Single infantry brigade with bridging unit, tanks, and APCs
- Authorization status
- Not formally authorised (per Adm. Domazet-Lošo)
- Bridgehead fate
- Evacuated in panic two days after operation commenced
Strategic Narrative Overview
Launched on 11 December 1991, the offensive initially achieved tactical surprise, meeting little resistance in its opening phase. A bridgehead was briefly established. However, the operation quickly faltered due to poor planning, inadequate reconnaissance, insufficient training, and dysfunctional command and control. Within two days, JNA forces north of Glina responded with tank and mortar fire, overwhelming the Croatian troops and forcing a panicked evacuation of the bridgehead.
01 / The Origins
In late 1991, Croatia was embroiled in the early stages of its War of Independence following the breakup of Yugoslavia. Croatian forces sought to expand territorial control in the Banovina region, where the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) maintained a significant presence. The Sisak Operational Group planned an offensive to establish a bridgehead across the Glina area, though the operation lacked formal authorisation, clear objectives, and adequate preparation.
03 / The Outcome
The offensive collapsed by 13 December 1991 with the hasty withdrawal of Croatian forces. A subsequent military investigation found almost no written documentation, including unit-level orders, making accountability difficult. Admiral Davor Domazet-Lošo concluded the operation was never formally authorised. The investigation identified systemic failures in planning and execution but did not formally charge any individual, leaving the episode as an instructive failure for the Croatian Army.
Belligerents & Mobilization Analysis
Side A
1 belligerent
Davor Domazet-Lošo.
Side B
1 belligerent
Kinetic Engagement Axis
Scroll horizontally to view full axis. Events plotted relatively.